This 6 month old Augur V2 video got me excited. I thought I’d share its value proposition, which I feel is currently being overlooked. If you’ve been in the space for some time, you know what Augur is: a decentralized prediction market and the biggest (in ETH)/earliest ICO on Ethereum. Prediction markets allow for better forecasting by leveraging the power of incentivized wisdom of the crowd. V2 will soon launch with a revamped UI, cheap 0x orders and stablecoin integration. It’s set to become the most accessible, fair and open betting platform out there. What you may not realize is its impact in the Defi space. Each market/prediction/question is represented by a token that can be traded in other Defi apps. This gives it incredible flexibility. Consider these possibilities:
DIY Derivative markets - You want to bet on Covid being a threat to the economy. Unfortunately JPOW’s printer is on and it’s pumping the equities markets. Why not create an Augur market that tracks the number of Covid deaths worldwide? What about betting on unemployment rates?
Sports betting - Betfair, Draftkings, Bet360? What about Augur, a provably fair betting alternative with unlimited liquidity that can’t prevent you from betting or run off with your money? More from Joey Krug here
Augur as an oracle - Understandably, everyone’s been raging about decentralized oracles lately; they’re how we merge blockchain and the real world. Need an oracle? Design your own with Augur, use it in your Dapp later.
Polling and futarchy - Incentivized polling has never been so easy. V2 is positioning itself to become a prime resource for the upcoming US elections this fall. Later versions could even be used to direct policy making by introducing conditional markets. I’ll let 2014 Vitalik explain
Bug bounties and smartcontract insurance - Easily insure yourself against smartcontract bugs or use your white hacker skills and pay yourself by designing your own bug bounties.
This synergetic composability gets incredibly interesting when combined with other Defi legos. How about token sets based on bets between the ratios of active addresses on Ethereum vs Bitcoin? Why not make a Uniswap pair between a Real-T token and a bet against Detroit real-estate to hedge your position and gain transaction fees on the side? Tokenomics With growing interest over new Defi tokens, REP will no doubt position itself among the top. It’s one of the few that actually benefits from using a blockchain and has a utility that isn’t just governance related. Staked REP consensus is used to validate markets and collect fees in the process. We’ve seen most successful Defi tokens pick up steam, especially in the past month, as mirrored by their sharp price increases: BNT +200%, KNC +90%, LEND + 70%, MKR +60%, LRC +140%. Augur V1 markets aren’t being used right now since the long awaited V2 is just around the corner. The repeated additional delays in V2’s launch date have kept its price comparatively low. With that in mind, if one believes in the team’s ability to deliver and for Defi to continue growing, REP seems to be an extremely strong long term play. Whether you're a token holder or not, you'll likely see its contribution in many spheres of the Defi world. The above examples only scratch the surface of what it enables. Disclaimer - I own some REP For more info: Augur V2 WhitepaperFinal pre-launch tasksThe Augur Edge by pacific_Oc3an
Found this write up on Kilocorn Aragon Court $ANJ A decentralized oracle protocol that handles subjective disputes which require the judgment of human jurors. These jurors stake a token called ANJ which allows them to be drafted into juries and earn fees for successfully adjudicating disputes. Launched on February 10, 2020
ATH: $0.031 (05/14/20)
ATL: $0.011 (05/05/20)
Aragon Network Jurisdiction token (ANJ) will be created and an Aragon Court instance will be deployed using ANJ as its token. During the pre-activation period, ANT holders were able to convert ANT to ANJ on a 1:100 basis (1 ANT = 100 ANJ) In phase 1, ANT holders could start being able to get ANJ to become jurors. There was a period of time during which all ANT holders that stake could get the same amount of ANJ per ANT. After this period of time, an Aragon Fundraising bonding curve was initialized and allows for staking and unstaking at a variable rate. Notable figures: Luis Cuende (founder of Aragon) - hacker and free culture lover who founded various startups since he got involved in free software development at age 12. - He was awarded as the best hacker of Europe under 18 at age 15. - He was also an Advisor to the Vice-president of the European Commission, Neelie Kroes, who is in charge of the EU's Digital Agenda. - Authored a book that reached the #1 in Amazon's Business category when he was 19. - Founded Stampery at 19 (digital certificates) - Founded Asturix at 13 (open source software) Tim Draper (investor in Aragon) - Bought $1 million of Aragon tokens OTC for $1 per when ANT was only $0.70 when he found out about Aragon Court. - Governance maximalist (early investor in Tezos when they were building governance mechanism directly into the ledger) - Billionaire VC investor that helps entrepreneurs drive their visions through funding, education, media, and government reform. He has founded thirty Draper venture funds, Draper University, Bizworld, and two statewide initiatives to improve governance and education. - Founded DFJ Venture which was involved with helping launch/scale many startups such as: Twitter, SpaceX, Ring, Baidu, Twilio etc. - One of the current largest crypto whales in the world Competition: Kleros Elevator pitch: The Aragon Court is a decentralized oracle protocol developed and maintained by the Aragon Network and it can be used by organizations to resolve subjective disputes with binary outcomes. Proposal Agreement disputes rely on the court where jurors stake tokens in order to earn the right to perform these services so they can earn a portion of the fees. Deeper Dive: Futarchy The premise is that if you have a decision which needs to be made, and you can relate that decision clearly to some objective success metric, you can use prediction markets to pick the option which is predicted to be more positively associated with your success metric. Anyone can participate in the prediction market, but attempting to manipulate the outcome of the decision by manipulating the prediction market represents a large cost so long as the success metric used to settle the market cannot be easily manipulated. High-level flow * Jurors deposit ANT into a bonding curve to generate ANJ (likely using Aragon Black’s implementation) * Jurors stake ANJ to the Court contract and schedule their activation and deactivation for the time period in which they can be drafted to rule on disputes. * Court fees and configuration parameters are controlled by a governor (the Aragon Network), but can only be modified for future terms to ensure that the rules can’t change for ongoing disputes as much as possible. * The creator of a dispute must pay fees to cover the maintenance gas costs of the Court and the jurors that will adjudicate their dispute. The governor of the Court gets a share of all the fees paid out in the Court. * Jurors are randomly drafted to adjudicate disputes. Because the Court isn’t sybil resistant, jurors chance to be drafted is proportional to the amount of ANJ they have activated. * When drafted, jurors must commit and reveal to a ruling. Failure to vote or reveal, results in a penalty for the jurors. * After a ruling is decided, it can be appealed by anyone a certain number of times, after which all active jurors will vote on the last appeal, providing an unappealable ruling. * When the final ruling is decided, all the adjudication rounds for the dispute can be settled taking into account the final ruling for rewards and penalties. DYOR: https://etherscan.io/token/0xcD62b1C403 ... B51780b184 https://github.com/aragon/aragon-court/tree/mastedocs https://forum.aragon.org/t/aragon-netwo ... dates/1263 https://github.com/aragon/whitepapebl ... /README.md https://aragon.org/blog/aragon-court-is-live-on-mainnet https://blog.aragon.one/aragon-chain/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/08/21/in ... -futarchy/
Braving the Wind and the Waves, DeFi Earns GNO Great Fame Overnight
Written by the CoinEx Institution, this series of jocular and easy to understand articles will show you everything you need to know about major cryptocurrencies, making you fully prepared before jumping into crypto! 2020 is destined to be an unusual year. It has witnessed the outbreak of Covid-19 all over the world and the economic crisis in many countries. The financial markets have plunged into a gloom, especially the market in the US where trading was temporarily halted five times in a row, an incident rare to even Warren Buffet, the godfather of American stock market. The cryptocurrency world has not been spared as many blockchain companies failed to survive because of the broken capital chain, causing a domino effect; investors in this world even started to hold negative towards cryptocurrencies after the big crash on March 12, which even dissuaded many outsiders from getting in… In a word, the first half of 2020 is really too hard! Many projects in the blockchain industry are struggling to survive, and those survivors deserve our praise. Among them is DeFi that was once popular. DeFi, developing at the critical time, is destined to ride the wind and waves this year, ushering in all opportunities and challenges. In fact, the crypto community has been concerned about DeFi since 2019. With its exploration of financial applications, DeFi has derived prediction markets, insurance, payment platforms, asset management, and identity information authentication from financial scenarios, in addition to stablecoins, borrowing and DEX. Today we are going to talk about the decentralized prediction market, part of DeFi’s product matrix. It looks a bit high-end. After all, not everyone can handle its slogan, “redistribute the future”. There are two representative players in this market segment, the leader Augur and the latecomer Gnosis. https://preview.redd.it/umpprozs9db51.jpg?width=512&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=d62eb4c4bdadd14a21d6e1f18c837076174644ce Gnosis means knowledge in Greek, also representing prophecy. The project deserves its name, which is to predict the future. Gnosis is a decentralized prediction market built on the Ethereum protocol; like Augur, it is one of the most compelling projects in the Ethereum ecosystem. Gnosis provides an open platform for people to predict the outcome of any event, which greatly simplifies the creation of customized prediction market applications and lowers the threshold for users. Its development can be traced back to the early days of the establishment of Ethereum. The team is led by Martin Koppelmann and Stefan George, experts in the prediction market, and an extraordinary advisory team represented by Vitalik Buterin, the Ethereum founder, and Joe Lubin, founder of ConsenSys. After 2 years of uninterrupted research and development, Gnosis has brought together the latest blockchain technologies such as Oracle, State Channels, and Futarchy. Its “Crowdsourced Wisdom” platform allows anyone to predict the market at any time, and those with accurate prediction can receive rewards. (PS: The age of the prophet is coming!) In addition, Gnosis has also opened its own platform to create Dapp (decentralized applications). By the way the beta version of Gnosis is one of the first Dapps based on Ethereum and was released in August 2015. In April 2017, Gnosis issued its token, GNO. Unlike the traditional way of token sale, the Gnosis team chose an improved Dutch auction: 10 million GNOs as planned, up to 9 million GNOs will be sold through auctions, and the remaining tokens belong to the team. In the improved Dutch auction as aforementioned, the bidding price of the auction target decreases in sequence until the auction termination condition is triggered. Contrary to the case in current mainstream token crowdfunding pricing methods, the price of GNO will be lowered for each new block. During the auction, participants can send ETH to the token address released by the official, promising to purchase GNO at or below the current price upon submission. When the auction termination condition is triggered (i.e. where ETH in the equivalent of 12.5 million US dollars is raised or 9 million GNOs sold), the final GNO price on the block will be determined as the GNO auction price. Under this mechanism, all participants in a successful bidding have the same cost of obtaining each GNO, and the final auction price of the GNO will not be higher than the price promised by the participants in the bidding. In fact, the Gnosis ecosystem consists of two tokens: GNO and OWL. GNO is a local token in the Gnosis system. Its main purpose is to generate OWL — users can obtain OWL by locking the GNO in a smart contract. Some people claim that Gnosis has innovated in its effort to emulate Augur and even excelled the latter by virtue of the introduction of Oracle, which improves efficiency and expands the scope of use:
Gnosis provides an open platform for people to predict the outcome of any event. At the same time, the automatic execution of Oracle and the smart contract enables players to enter the prediction market more flexibly and freely, which not only simplifies the creation of customized prediction market applications but makes it even more efficient;
Oracle and smart contracts can automatically execute the prediction market, bringing it a grander vision that Gnosis participants may be no longer individuals; in the Internet of Things, the information collected by sensors can also enter into the blockchain as an information asset for prediction through Oracle, further expanding its scope of use.
With the popularity of DeFi, GNO rose to fame overnight. According to the data shown on feixiaohao.com, GNO rose 94.56% this April, its community has also gained growing attention, and followers on Twitter and Reddit have surged in a month. Just like LBC, an obscure cryptocurrency that suddenly went viral, GNO deserves its fame on the one hand, and, on the other, it happened with a help of DeFi. At present, GNO has been listed in the new first-tier exchange CoinEx, providing users with more trading options for DeFi-related projects. As DeFi braves the wind and waves, how will GNO seize this opportunity? Will its trading volume and popularity continue to rise? Welcome to share your opinions in CoinEx! About CoinEx As a global and professional cryptocurrency exchange service provider, CoinEx was founded in December 2017 with Bitmain-led investment and has obtained a legal license in Estonia. It is a subsidiary brand of the ViaBTC Group, which owns the fifth largest BTC mining pool, which is also the largest of BCH mining, in the world. CoinEx supports perpetual contract, spot, margin trading, and other derivatives trading, and its service reaches global users in nearly 100 countries/regions with various languages available, such as Chinese, English, Korean and Russian. Website:https://www.coinex.com/ Twitter:https://twitter.com/coinexcom Telegram:https://t.me/CoinExOfficialENG Click hereto register on CoinEx!
Have there been any token-value-maximizing-futarchy DAOs?
In An Introduction to Futarchy (https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/08/21/introduction-futarchy/) Vitalik Buterin describes a protocol for allocating a DAO's resources in ways that speculators predict will maximize the value of some token. Has this actually been implemented in any DAOs yet? I've googled it but can only find some experiments, or advisory prediction markets - nothing where the allocation is fully decided by the market. I'm also curious about how a DAO controlled by futarchy, with no goal other than maximizing its token's value, would behave. Can somebody enlighten me?
[Mod Request] Can we clean up the sub and get back to technical threads only?
And I mean really technical. Too many thinly veiled ICO/Poject pump threads. Even if it means we have fewer topics, ICOs and Project chatter need to to find their own places to shill. ethereum should be for EIPs, Dev Updates, Questions from new and old timers and politicking about gas prices (or whatever is of flavour of the month wrt scaling, casper, technical hurdles, etc.).
It should not be about OmiseGo, although it can be about Plasma implementaions / progress / testnets.
It should not be about Augur, although it could be about futarchy and game theory.
It should not be about MakerDAO, but it could be about the design of stable coins.
More policing in here is needed. We're closing in on Eternal September and Up/Down votes aren't cutting it anymore. The old timers are getting tired of reading drivel and the newcomers are getting the wrong impression about what this sub is for. Perhaps, new and more active mods on the roster would assist, along with some clearer rules (like if the project name is in the title, it's probably an advertisement and not about the tech, or something to that effect).
What will happen to other Ethereum competitors in 5 years? How will they differentiate themselves?
It's clear Ethereum killers can build better tech today but no amount of technology, funding, or talent will build the massive community Ethereum has overnight. Now I know the response to this could be, "Well they'll just die off and fade into obscurity" but I don't necessarily think that's the case for every competitor. I think once Ethereum starts to really scale, the ETH killers will have to differentiate themselves with something other than technology, because the tech is all open source and Ethereum can add whatever they add. (for example Web Assembly with eWASM) My guess is they may have a different tech stack but most likely they'll use different forms of governance to draw in other users. You can already see this unfolding with Arthur Breitman's post on Futurachy in Tezos. Thoughts?
Ethereum will possibly give birth to the State of Earth
Hello again. I'm under the impression sooner or later Ethereum will give birth to the State of Earth. The State of Earth will be an autonomous legal system which every human-being will be part of; it will reign and rule everything that happens on the planet, being itself governed by transparent and pervasive decentralized algorithms. It will not start out that big. It will initially be just a popular DApp, probably with much lesser goals such as serving as a freelancing platform or a social network. As time passes and it gets bigger and more popular, decentralized governing features will start being necessary. Voting mechanisms, liquid democracies, futarchies; many ideas will be explored and developed. Once the DApp gets big enough, it will start looking more like a big company such as Facebook. At that point, the decentralized governing features will be very elaborate and mature. From that to becoming a state, all it takes is a fork from someone with crazy enough ideologies. Initially, nobody will care. Eventually, people will get upset at their governments for whatever reason, and start claiming they're not part of their country, but of the State of Earth. That will be more like a joke and a protest, except when people don't get it and it stops being one. Now governments are getting angry because people aren't paying their taxes. At that point, The State of Earth will need to defend its citizens. I'd not be surprised if a high-tech army is eventually formed, possibly with drones, since those are effective war tools. It will be hard for centralized governments to deal with a worldwide army that literally has no location: you can't nuke Ethereum out of the globe. It is obvious who would win a war, if such a thing happened. That is a very bizarre future that looks like a badly written fiction. I find it likely. Even if that doesn't happen, I still believe it will at least be the backbone of the internet economy, as I explained on my last post in 2016. What do you think?
Microsoft, Intel Back Ethereum-Based Token to Reward Consortium Efforts
The Enterprise Ethereum Alliance (EEA), the consortium charged with creating standards for businesses to build applications using the ethereum blockchain, has created a system of reward tokens to incentivize groups of companies. The system is backed by Microsoft and Intel. Showcased Tuesday at Devcon 5, the annual ethereum developers conference being held in Osaka, Japan, the so-called trusted reward token is a way of accruing and calculating rewards for active participation in a consortium. Michael Reed, who manages the blockchain program within Intel’s software and solutions group, explained there are three types of tokens used to motivate participation: a reward token, a reputation token, and a penalty token. Reed told CoinDesk:
“It really can be applied to any consortium to incentivize teamwork. The example we are using is a software development consortium like EEA, where we are trying to motivate activities like editing and contributing to specifications, developing and adding code. Then, of course, you could apply penalties for negatives, such as lack of contribution, lack of review, missing deadlines and so on.”
The idea of using tokens to align companies continues a long-standing strain of thought within the ethereum community. Manifested in early experiments with decentralized autonomous organizations and chief scientist Vitalik Buterin’s interest in concepts like futarchy, this sort of tokenization lets organizations use economic bets and voting to guide decision-making. The trusted reward token is the first use case to emerge from the Token Taxonomy Initiative (TTI), born within Microsoft to establish a common framework for tokenizing value across a range of blockchain networks, not just within the EEA or on ethereum. (Also involved in the build were: ConsenSys Solutions, PegaSys, and Kaleido; Envision Blockchain; and iExec.) The TTI operates rather like a workshop where firms can decide what features they require from a token, such as being fungible or non-fungible; transferable or non-transferable; and which networks they might using, be that Hyperledger, R3 Corda or ethereum.
Carrot and stick
In the same way that the ERC-20 standard has been ascribed to various networks and use cases, the trusted reward token can be attached to any unit of value the consortium agrees upon. Describing the rewards process as “grant contracts,” Marley Gray, principal architect at Microsoft, said: “Really we have the ability to tag it anything.” To effectively incentivize participants requires not only a carrot but also a stick, said Gray, noting that all the penalty tokens a participant accumulates (demerits, essentially) have to be factored in before rewards tokens can be redeemed. “One of the problems you have is people making large commitments but never following through,” he said. “This is almost more damaging than not stepping up at all because it leads to long delays when people are thinking things are happening and they are not.” It’s perhaps not surprising a tokenized rewards system has been born out of the EEA, where 250-plus member companies have been herded together to work out a set of common interoperable specs and standards, a difficult job which has been driven by executive director Ron Resnick. “Devcon 5 will be where attendees will experience how ethereum — enabled by EEA member-driven standards — delivers real-world value through tokenized enterprise solutions,” said Resnick. Marley Gray image via CoinDesk archives.
Classification After POS 3.0, Let’s talk About Cosmos’ Bond-PoS and Tezos
We wrote this article in the medium. The view comes from our experince of running nodes on Tezos and Cosmos Testnet. If you like to read in medium, here is the link.
Classification After POS 3.0, Let’s talk About Cosmos’ Bond-PoS
Recently Wetez is preparing for the Cosmos GameofStake. Wetez has also been running on the Cosmos test network. In the upcoming December, the probability of release of Cosmos mainnet is very high. Like Tezos] Wetez will also dedicate to be a genesis validators on Cosmos. It took a while for us to study the consensus of Cosmos. In the beginning, I felt that the PoS of Cosmos and the PoS of Tezos were not much different, but as I dig deeper, I found out some stunning parts. A little obvious feeling is that Cosmos is more comprehensive than my imagination in the system integration part. Cosmos goes deeper, but is slightly rough and rushed; On the other hand, Tezos is rich in the foundation, the fundamental code is quite structured. There is no serious problem after the mainnet launch. Tezos is moving step by step. I guess what makes difference is the location of each team. The team of Tezos is in Paris, and Cosmos is originated from Canada. Culture shapes different attributes. Comparing the PoS mechanism of these two outstanding projects, there are different parts, same parts and each of projects has its own advantages and disadvantages:
Nothing At Stake and on-chain governance
Both of them use the deposited bond and slash punishment method to solve this important problem, Nothing At Stake, during PoS 1.0 to PoS 2.0. The definitions of Slash fo each project is different. Cosmos will punish validators if they don’t vote. Tezos stresses the on-chain governance but Tezos didn’t include the vote to their slash mechanism. In the comparison of governance implementation, Cosmos is more radical. During the test net period, Wetez did not vote for the proposal and therefore lost lots of token because of Slash. A bloody lesson for us. (Fortunately, it is only the test coin lol). Tezos just launched their vote module and I am looking forward to the interesting experiment of the idea of Futarchy. Cosmos’s voting process will follow the mainnet, and we can discuss more by that time. Compare governance difference now, Tezos emphasizes the percentage of voting and participation. Furtarchy can somehow solve the problem of participation, but predicting market of voting is hard to be put into practice.（If you are interested in idea of Furtarchy, check this mediumIn summary, Cosmos’ on-chain governance is relatively mediocre. Tezos is more radical and we look forward to see how Tezos achieves it. 2. Delegation in PoS consensus This analysis is helpful for cryptocurrency holders. Like Tezos, Cosmos has additional bonus rewards for nodes to ensure the stability of the network every year. The holder of the Atom can share and obtain the right of bonus rewards by delegating to validators. If they don’t perform their right of delegation, the exisiting Atom will be diluted because of annual inflation in Cosmos system. The situation is quite scary for Cosmos. Currently seen in the white paper describes that in the case of two thirds of token participation, there will be 7% of inflation. In the case of less than two-thirds of token participation, the maximum inflation can be 22% According to our experience of Tezos, if it is still in a bear market like now, deposited Atom can exceed more than two thirds of total amounts in the fourth month after the mainnet launch. If it is in the bull market, it will be hard to say. The liquidity will be relatively high. For Atom holders, the dividend reward of delegation is higher in the early stage so don’t forget to delegate your Atom. 3. Deposited Bond details Tezos’ delegation market has long-term hidden danger. In the early days, bakers shouted to community that they can pay the deposited bond for delegators. However this leads to bad habits continuing to this day and if you google the over-delegated problem, you will find more discussion. The way how Cosmos does is more thoughtful. If you want to entrust the node for delegation service, clients need to undertake the bond lost on their own. On Cosmos, deposited bond is a concept of the pool. If the validators do evil or are not competent to maintain the blockchain, the bond will be deducted as punishment. Validators and Clients bear the loss together. On Tezos, the deposited bond is the concept of the block , if validators pay the bond for their clients, only validators will undertake the cost in each block. Validators as a crucial part of PoS consensus. It derives into two different kinds of PoS because of the deposited system. 4. Bond-PoS Cosmos officials tend to call their consensus as Bond-PoS. Personally I think that Cosmos’s consensus is an enhanced version of DPoS with BFT and bond mechanism. EOS is based on DPoS consensus, and there are 21 validators. Cosmos add more validators to 100 in the early stage, validators is chosen from staking amount rather than vote and validators needs bond as deposit. Cosmos has the most stringent requirement for validators in history. It requires validators should be companies, should build their own hardware, should vote for all proposals, and etc. Being a validator on Cosmos is not easy. Community responsibility and competence of maintaining a node are indispensable. 5. Block confirmation If Cosmos is an enhanced version of DPoS, it will definitely be faster, and the actual test result proves it. Tezos is fixed for 60 seconds per block. Cosmos is about a few seconds but it is not fixed yet. It shouldn’t just compare TPS because they are based on different mechanisms. The validator can only propose one block in each round . During that round, there will be a prevote and pre-commit phase. Block is confirmed by passing two-thirds of participants in each phase. If it is successful, it will be very fast. However, If it is not successful, it needs to restart one round again. It is hard to say how long one block confirmation will be until the real situation happens. Tezos is different. Tezos can propose multiple blocks at the same height, and choose the most endorsements block finally. Cosmos cannot propose multiple blocks. If one block propose fails, it will start again. Of course, both projects have slash punishment for double signs, which will help prevent forks and prevent the chaos in BCH community from happening. There are still many aspects to compare. Maybe we will discuss it in the next article. If you get curious about these two projects. We recommend that read both Cosmos and Tezos white paper and combine with the result of blockchain scanner. If you have any questions or doubts want to discuss with us, follow our twitter and pm us. In general, Tezos and Cosmos have a good maintenance method for network security. Although the implementation details of the consensus are different, I don’t think these are the key to the success of the public chain. Success depends on the ecology. On ecology, Cosmos is one step ahead, creating Ethermint, a 1:1 anchored Ethereum side chain which provides a convenient funnel to connect Ethereum ecosystem. However Tezos aim for the long run. The ecology is not started yet. In this stage, Tezos foundation is funding education organization and universities to foster new developers for Tezos community. Both projects still have a long way to go. Wetez wallet aims to provide the most secure and user-friendly mobile wallet for PoS based blockchain. Follow us for more PoS insights. Wetez_Wallet https://twitter.com/Wetez_wallet
Casper interest rates as a futarchy Objective function
There has been a lot of interest in futarchy as a mechanism for governing decentralized autonomous organizations, bottom-level protocol decisions (probably too late for the DAO fork but for something like Serenity certainly) and challenges like determining where to allocate funds for public goods development. Essentially, every time there is a choice to be made, use a prediction market to determine what people think the score of some desired outcome metric would be if decision A is made, and what score would be if decision B is made, and take the one that the market thinks would provide a better outcome. Both in a decentralized context and in its original proposed context in national and corporate governance, however, an important challenge is: what exactly is the outcome metric that the futarchy tries to optimize? So far, in the context of DAOs on top of ethereum, I have advocated the use of the DAO token/ETH price for the token of that particular DAO. The advantage of this metric is that it is easy to measure in a decentralized way, and the measurement algorithm poses few avenues for corruption. However, there are obvious downfalls - many DAOs want to do things other than maximize profit, have ethical constraints, serve some social objective even at the expense of profit maximizations, so alternate metrics are desired. One alternative metric that I have come up with, inspired by both Avsa's fork vote by ether commitment and my discussions with Ralph Merkle where I pointed out that a "futarchy as world government" would need to have a reliable way of detecting the probability of existential risks or else it would dangerously ignore such scenarios, is the use of interest rates on long-term bonds as an objective function - the lower the better. Interest rates signify people's willingness to make long-term commitments for the future, and sacrifice both present enjoyment and present optionality for a greater return in a world that, in extremis, may possibly not even exist; the lower the market interest rate is, the more people are willing to commit. The Ethereum protocol, and DAOs, are both areas where existential risks are very high, and arguably the long-term stability of the system is precisely the "social value" that we want the protocol to provide. Additionally, in the case of Ethereum specifically, proof of stake will come with a requirement to deposit and lock down one's funds for 4 months in order to participate - and if a validator node acts incorrectly then the deposit may be completely destroyed, a risk that makes proof of stake bonds very hard to securitize (ie. make tradeable via some kind of wrapper contract backed by the bond). Hence, people's willingness to participate in proof of stake arguably corresponds heavily to trust in the stability of the system at least for Casper's 4-month term. Note that there are two proposed versions of Casper, one which targets a fixed level of participation and adjusts interest rates to compensate and one which provides a fixed interest rate and lets participation levels float - in the first case, low interest rates can be the objective function, and in the second case it can be a high percentage of ether participating in Casper. If the markets predict a lower interest rate, or a higher level of ether participation, if a given proposal is accepted, then the proposal likely benefits protocol and ecosystem stability and therefore is likely good. Note that the metric is definitely gameable in some circumstances - for example, a hypothetical malicious proposal that prints 100 million new ether and donates them to future Casper participants will definitely secure high participation levels and low "official" interest rates (the de-facto interest rate including the 100m new ether will of course be massive). Hence, this mechanism cannot be given absolute power over the system and should be used in conjunction with either social consensus, voting, or a secondary futarchy that actually does try to maximize the price of ETH or some DAO token (or a combination of all three; in my opinion good governance is in most cases multi-heuristic).
Prediction markets to bet/vote on hard forks, trustlessly: the ingredients are all here
Nearly 1.5 years ago Paul Sztorc proposed prediction markets (also called "futarchy") as a way of solving the block size governance issue - have a prediction market where people can bet on what the price of Bitcoin would be if event X happens and what the price would be if event X doesn't happen, and if the price on the "X happens" market is higher, then X gets implemented. With Ethereum, the ingredients are actually here to implement all of this today, and in fact, unlike Paul Sztorc's proposals, you can do this fully trustlessly - no curators and no consortiums involved (though there are a few ways that the resulting designs are suboptimal if you don't rely on such things; I'll get into both approaches later). The two key ingredients are as follows. First, decentralized prediction markets. We have augur and gnosis, though in this case the more suitable model would probably be the TRUMPY and TRUMPN tokens that have been traded on etherdelta. In general, prediction markets have been run on ethereum a few times and basically work as expected. The second ingredient is trustlessly reading the Bitcoin blockchain inside Ethereum. This also exists today, in the form of btcrelay, a Bitcoin "light client" that sits inside of an Ethereum smart contract and verifies block headers' proof of work to determine the longest chain (as well as being able to verify transactions against the chain via merkle proofs). In Blockstream's sidechains paper, Blockstream defines a sidechain as "a blockchain that validates data from other blockchains"; thanks to this very broad definition, we sometimes proudly market btcrelay as the world's first production sidechain, however it is important to note that while btcrelay can read the Bitcoin blockchain, it can't write to it, so the second part of the two-way-peg isn't solved, unless you're willing to accept a scheme that relies on ether deposits with large safety margins; then you can fake it with cryptoeconomic incentives - and some of our schemes will do just that.
What is the goal?
In its purest form, we can technically describe the most commonly proposed form of coin futarchy as follows. On some chain, there exists some primary token T (think T = bitcoin), and a reference token R (think R = the US dollar). If there is an event X that must be voted on, then a feature emerges where any T holder can split their T into T-X and T-no-X, and any R holders can split their R into R-x and R-no-X. If X is implemented, then a T-X token can be converted into a T and an R-X can be converted into an R; if X is rejected, then the same is the case but with T-no-X and R-no-X. We then look at the price of T-X denominated in R-X and the price of T-no-X denominated in R-no-X; if one is higher than the other for a sufficient time period, then that side is declared the winner. There are two ways to view how this works. One is through the lens of markets, where T-X / R-X is viewed as the price prediction if X wins, and T-no-X / R-no-X is viewed as the price prediction if X loses; whatever decision the market thinks will lead to a more favorable price wins. The other way to view this is through the lens of voting: you can view the act of taking one's T, splitting it, and then selling a bit of T-no-X and using the proceeds to buy a bit of T-X as being a vote, where the vote has the force of action: the vote means "I am willing to increase my degree of membership in this community if X is implemented".
How would this be implemented?
On Ethereum, we can have the reference token be ether, but that's arguably a bad idea, as it would drive outcomes that try to increase BTC / ETH, ie. trying to benefit bitcoin at the expense of ethereum rather than benefitting the two together. A simple way out is to have the reference token be Digix gold, but that introduces a centralized party, Digix. This is arguably not that bad, as if Digix defaults then the results could be ignored, though you could make the case that it would invite attempts at manipulation by making false rumors saying "Digix will not honor their commitements to redeem their gold tokens if Segwit is adopted" (thereby pushing R-SEGWIT down and hence pushing T-SEGWIT / R-SEGWIT up, manipulating the market in favor of Segwit); it's up to each individual to determine how serious a problem this would be in practice. What about the T side? BTC cannot be directly represented on Ethereum, but what we can do is have a fake sidechain via collateral. The design would work as follows. A contract would store 200 * n ETH and issue n E-BTC coins as well as n E-ANTI-BTC coins. By submitting a real bitcoin into the bitcoin address stored into the contract, and submitting a btcrelay proof that you did this together with an E-ANTI-BTC coin, you can claim 200 ETH. The price of an E-ANTI-BTC coin is thus equal to 200 ETH minus 1 BTC. E-BTC coins give you the right to a share of the remaining ether. Note that this scheme as written cannot survive BTC going above 200 ETH; you can either push the deposit requirements higher (say, to 1000 ETH), or add a mechanism that forces the ETH depositors to deposit more ETH when the BTC prices go high enough, though without proper 2-way convertibility the scheme certainly is not perfect (note that the collateral doesn't need to be ETH; it could also be digix gold or whatever else). If you want to do something a bit cleaner, you could go for difficulty futures - have the R token be ether, and have the T token be an asset that releases X ETH, where X equals the bitcoin mining difficulty divided by some constant. Difficulty correlates with price, and so using mining difficulty as a proxy for price is quite reasonable, and mining difficulty also has the advantage that using btcrelay to verify the difficulty of the main chain is very easy. In the case of Segwit and Unlimited, we can actually try out one or more or all of these models. Verifying that a >1MB hard fork was carried out with btcrelay is not too difficult: prove, one branch at a time, the total size of a block that was committed to in the main chain, and return 1 if the sum of the transaction sizes exceeds one megabyte. There are ways to optimize this further if interactive verification is allowed. Alternatively, you could take the even easier path and instead of verifying the consensus rules, just verify the signalling rule - return 1 as soon as 95% of the blocks in a given blockspan vote for Segwit, or 75% of the blocks in a given blockspan signal for some hard-forking max block size increase. If someone wants to code this, the tools are all there.
On Coin-lock voting, Futarchy and Optimal Decentralized Governance
There has been a lot of interest in decentralized governance algorithms in the Ethereum community, both recently in the search for tools for getting consensus on resolving the DAO issue and more broadly because one of the attractions of Ethereum is the ability to more easily implement such things. Outside of the Ethereum community, there has also been a substantial body of research into developing voting algorithms that are more "incentive-compatible" in various ways than simple 51% majority vote. The primary contenders include:
Inside the Ethereum community, there are already projects looking to use each one of these. Before the DAO blew up, there was interest in creating higher-level tools to essentially become a de-facto liquid democracy. Akasha is using quadratic voting for rating posts and comments, and Maker is exploring intergrating futarchy into its DAO governance. There are naturally arguments between proponents of these camps. In the case of futarchy, it is highly flexible and can theoretically work to maximize any desired objective that it can measure, even against the wishes of the majority of its participants (provided that a sufficient number of them are economically rational). However, it runs into the critiques that (1) finding metrics that are easy to measure is hard, and complexity-of-value problems abound, and (2) outsiders are just as able to participate as insiders, and it is potentially vulnerable to outside groups manipulating the futarchy markets, whereas voting systems naturally protect against this by limiting participation to a particular community. Quadratic voting is theoretically incentive-compatible, but implementing it as-is requires both (1) a one-ID-per-person system, and (2) ideally a way to prevent one user from bribing another to vote in a certain way (both of these are implied in QV's original political voting context, which has robust identity verification and secret ballot properties, but neither are present by default on the blockchain). Assuming a very high degree of economic efficiency and lack of moral constraints or other friction, many forms of voting break down entirely: voters would simply sell their votes to the highest bidder, and every decision would essentially become an all-pay auction; it's only because of morality, communicational friction and other such considerations that the mechanism works more nicely. Futarchy achieves better performance assuming such secondary motivations do not exist, but fails to take advantage of them if they do. What could be nice to have is a voting mechanism that combines the benefits of both: the mechanism looks like an improved voting system, and so assuming the token holders are generally "nice" people it acts like an improved version of voting, but assuming bribery and the like is successful and rampant the economic model rather collapses into something like futarchy, which can still provide fairly good results under many circumstances (in fact, it gets better the higher the stakes are). Avsa's fork vote by ether commitment is interesting because it actually comes surprisingly close to creating such a system, to some degree. To see how, let us analyze the economics. Anyone can vote, and the vote is weighted by the amount of ether that you vote with, but unlike a simple coin vote like http://carbonvote.com, here voting requires actually locking up your ether for some time if the decision that you favor goes through (if the decision you opposed goes through, you can recover your ether as soon as the vote ends). Users can choose how long they lock up their ether, and the weight of the vote is also multiplied by the square of this length of time. Locking up ether is, economically speaking a cost, however it is a cost that is lower if you are confident that you will not want to exit the Ethereum ecosystem. Hence, there is an element of futarchy in the vote - in fact, it's a futarchy based on implied interest rates. Avsa's original proposal has the weight of a vote dependent on the square of the lock up time; personally I think it should be the square root, so that the lock up cost relative to the number of votes follows a similar function to quadratic voting. A one-person-one-ID system is not needed as the system is ether-weighted. Now let's see what happens if bribes are possible. Then, a faction that wants action A to be taken would need to make bribes either to pro-A voters to make them accept longer lock-up periods, or to pro-B voters to get them to accept shorter lock-up periods and thus lower vote scores, or to non-voters to get them to make low-cost short-duration pro-A votes. Unfortunately, you can't bribe people to "lock up for one more day than you otherwise would have" because you have no idea how much people "otherwise would have voted", and they can lie to try to get your money; the only bribe that would work is a blanket subsidy to every voter that is higher the longer they lock up their coins if they vote A or the shorter they lock up their coins if they vote B. However, because of the "futarchy" element this is more expensive than a simple all-pay auction: if option A genuinely creates more uncertainty, then buying A-votes through bribes will be expensive and buying B-votes will be cheaper, whereas if option A creates less uncertainty then buying A-votes will be cheaper and buying B-votes will be more expensive. An attacker looking to "buy" A-votes will thus have to settle for bribing B-voters to vote with lower lockup periods, but this is highly expensive as it would essentially entail paying almost everyone, including A-voters (lest they get incentivized to become low-lockup B voters to claim the attacker's bounty). This is not a perfect futarchy argument, and it particularly only focuses on the "interest rate" version of futarchy and not token-price-maximization or any other objective, but it does get quite far along the way. A worthwhile direction for future research would be to more explicitly start from the first principles of voting, quadratic voting and futarchy and see if there can be a broader framework to bring them together and create a hybrid system that provides the best of all worlds.
Now that the Ethereum infrastructure is becoming increasingly mature, I thought that it would make sense to try to do some empirical tests of just how effective some of the cryptoeconomic tricks that we're been developing are. To that end, I wanted to throw out some proposed experiments that I would live to see community members take on; if you want to do any of them I'll be happy to offer any advice, and if your work is of sufficient quality it may even be worth a DEVgrant.
A large number of mechanisms that people have looked at on top of Ethereum have to do with using market prices as inputs into decentralized autonomous processes. A common example is futarchy, where an organization makes decisions by launching a pair of prediction markets on some publicly verifiable metric (eg. user adoption, its own stock price, happiness survey results), where the first market is denominated in a currency which pays out $1 if the company makes decision A and $0 otherwise, and the second market is denominated in a currency which pays out $1 if the company makes decision B and $0 otherwise. The theory is that the first market only has value if decision A is made, and so reflects the market's opinions on the likely value of the metric if decision A is made, and likewise with the second market for decision B. Whichever market shows a higher price, that decision is taken. For example, we may want to launch a pair of prediction market on some metric such as the price of ether, mining difficulty (reflecting the power of the network), etc, where the first market is valid if the Serenity release includes a line of code to increase the balance of the Ethereum Foundation's address (or possibly some other foundation's address, or some DAO's address, etc) by 4.5 million ether to pay for a greatly expanded and prolonged research and development effort, and the second market is valid if no such thing is done. The markets would then determine whether the market is more optimistic about the given metric (price, difficulty, etc) if the extra issuance is done or not. The efficient market hypothesis essentially states that such markets work reasonably well, ie. if by publicly available knowledge (strong-form EMH also includes private knowledge but is much more controversial) the expected return of a token is p, then the price should be roughly p. The argument is this: if the price is q < p, then there is an opportunity for people to buy the tokens at q, sit on them and reclaim an expected p, and thereby earn an expected p - q arbitrage profits. If the price is r > p, then people can short the tokens, and earn an expected r - p arbitrage profits. However, the strength of this "arbitrage force" is not infinite: there may not be many market participants with enough information to feel comfortable making such trades, and furthermore trading on the market exposes you to great secondary risk. For example, suppose that a company is deciding whether or not to hire a given CEO, and is making a prediction market on their revenues for the next 5 years in the cases of (i) them hiring the CEO and (ii) them not hiring a CEO. Suppose that you somehow know for a fact that hiring the CEO will add $5 million to their future revenues. However, the current expectation of the company's revenues is $1 billion, and really it could be anywhere from $500 million to $1.5 billion. Suppose that you see this market, and the CEO's cronies have secretly shorted the no shares and bought the yes shares, and thereby inflated the difference to $30 million; the CEO is using this information to demand a $10m salary. Would you be willing to buy no shares and sell yes shares? Not necessarily; assuming each share on the market represents a millionth of revenue, your expected gain from buying a no share and selling a yes share is $30 - $5 = $25, but depending on which way the decision goes you are also exposed to anything from a loss of $500 to a gain of $500 because of all the other factors affecting revenue, and you may not be willing to accept that risk. Hence, the empirical question is, under what circumstances is the arbitrage force strong enough to overpower manipulators? There are reasons to believe that, in fact, prediction markets will be among the most manipulation-resistant; unlike stock markets, where stock prices may be predicated on revenues 50 years down the line with great uncertainties, and where shorting is difficult and exposes you to a liquidation event if the price further goes up temporarily to a level above what you can pay, prediction market shares are about a specific event and usually have prices bounded within some specific range so there are no liquidation risks for shorters (this is definitely true for LMSR-style systems). However, even still the empirical question remains of just how good they are. Here are some proposed experiments that could be done on Augur, Gnosis or whatever else:
Launch a prediction market on "what will the output of this smart contract be on Mar 30, 2016?". The contract will be simply and verifiably coded to output 5. Launch a separate smart contract where some specific set of users is rewarded if the average market price exceeds 5; the more it exceeds 5 the higher their reward. This encourages them to try to manipulate the market upwards. See how well the market manages to keep the price close to 5.
Same as (1), except instead the smart contract returns either 0 or 10 depending on the value of a random bit (eg. a block hash); the expected value is still 5 but there is now risk.
Same as (1), except this time we launch two markets: one where the smart contract pays ethereum_blockchain_difficulty / 1 trillion + 5 and the other pays just ethereum_blockchain_difficulty / 1 trillion. Reward the manipulators for pushing the difference in prices above 5. To make the problem favor the manipulators more, reduce the 1 trillion constant to something lower. This simulates the "should we hire the CEO" example.
Same as (3), but replace 5 with a constant X that is only revealed to a select team. Use an interactive protocol to commit to the constant, so that they are convinced that you will need to input a value into the smart contract and that value can only be X, but set the protocol up so that they cannot prove X to others.
Same as (3) or (4), but randomize and privately reveal the direction in which the manipulators are incentivized to manipulate.
A lot of DAOs on ethereum are starting to look at voting mechanisms for decision-making. Can we bribe participants to vote in specific ways? Here's one interesting live experiment: use BTCrelay to trustlessly bribe bitcoin miners to vote for the Classic fork on blocks where block.number % 4 > 0 and Core otherwise (the weird bribing rule is chosen so that (i) it doesn't actually affect the outcome of the decision, as the threshold for Classic is 75% and so assuming Core and Classic miners are equally susceptible to the bribe it should proportionately shrink p-0.75 (where p is the percentage of miners that vote for Classic) and not change the sign, and (ii) so that we can actually tell how many miners are taking the bribe and don't have to argue about whether or not they took the bribe because they wanted Classic to succeed anyway).
DAO 51% attacks
Another attack on DAOs is the simple "buy 51% of the shares and use them to vote to give yourself 100% of the money" attack; in corporate land, this (and much more subtle versions of this) is essentially the reason why shareholder regulation exists. One possible countermeasure is to build in a cooldown period so as to let people pile in even more money on the "good guy" side if such an attack takes place, preventing the vote from passing through and even allowing the good guys to in turn disenfranchise the attackers. Make a DAO to empirically test this. (Note: this is essentially equivalent to the arguments around P + epsilon attacks)
Quadratic voting has seen a lot of attention recently as an incentive-compatible voting scheme. The idea is simple: anyone can make k votes for a decision by paying k^2 tokens; from there it's just a majority vote. The theory is that if someone gains x from a decision being made, and each vote has a probability p of being pivotal, then they have the incentive to keep buying votes for as long as the price of the next vote is less than px. Because the total price of k votes is k^2, and we know from calculus that the derivative of k^2 is 2k, users will have the incentive to keep buying tokens until 2k > px; hence, they will buy k = px/2 tokens. You can see from this math that the number of tokens that a voter buys should be proportional to x, ie. the amount that they gain from the decision being made. Hence, the number of votes that a voter makes should actually reflect the strength of their preference, and not just which option they prefer. We can empirically test this by setting up a quadratic voting DAO, and setting up choices that give users very obvious incentives. For example, the DAO could choose between decision A and B, where A gives user u x coins, user u x coins, etc, and B could give user u y coins, user u y coins, etc. We can then let these users vote, and see what the correlation is between whether sum(y) > sum(z) and whether A is chosen or B.
Conditional futures for DAOs to outsource decision-making
Let's say there is a DAO that only wants to maximize profits. There is a set of actions it can take at different times. For argument's sake, examples of these actions would be accepting code changes, . A component of this DAO is a futures market. Standardized futures contracts are traded in this DAO, but it also has conditional futures markets, in which the contract is cancelled if a particular action does or does not occur. If the futures market values the DAO in five years much more highly in the market conditional on it taking a particular action, the DAO implements that action. Code changes seem to be a complicated instance, but perhaps an elegant solution would be creating a new instance of the DAO, and forwarding all its funds to the new instance. I haven't worked out any details of implementation here, but is there anything I've mentioned which wouldn't be possible with Ethereum, and is there any obvious room for exploitation? Because if this is actually possible, we can combine this with things like voting systems for more complicated derivatives markets based on other statistics outside of simple share values, and essentially have far more dynamic DAOs than the conventional image of a file storage service with a static codebase. These could fulfill complicated values and optimize for statistics that are democratically chosen to be important. This is potentially huge. Imagine Bill Gates setting up one of these with a $50,000 seed fund, to optimize for low malaria incidence. The market trades on actions the DAO can take to minimize malaria rates, including investment in scientific research, advertising campaigns in favour of effective anti-malaria charities, and financial investment to maintain the DAO's own existence. And if that can succeed, what's to stop 'malevolent' rational DAOs from existing too? If one can be optimized for minimizing malaria, why can't one be optimized for maximizing malaria? Again, big disclaimer regarding my uncertainty around the coherence of this idea, the practicalities of it, the originality, etc.
idea for a short story where the main characters are blockchains as humans arguing about philosophy.
Bitcoin could talk about the petro dollar, fractional reserve banking, and quantitative easing. Revolution by preventing counterfeiting. Bitcoin cash would mostly agree with bitcoin, but instead of using economic reasoning, bitcoin cash is religiously worshipping satoshi. He thinks that lightning is against the plan of almighty satoshi. Revolution by devotion to satoshi's plan. Bitcoin hivemind could talk about detecting lies and corruption in politics to build a more perfect government and legal system. Revolution by honesty. Amoveo would talk about insured crowd funding contracts to replace taxation, futarchy contracts to replace leadership. Giant businesses and governments all collapsing at the same time. Revolution by stopping the hierarchies. Ethereum would be admitting how hard it is to plan for the future. Saying it is better to keep an open mind and be prepared to react quickly to whatever may happen. It is bad to devote yourself to any mission, because then you will have enemies who dislike your mission. Tendermint is everyone's friend. His dream is to help everyone else achieve their dreams by connecting them together and encouraging collaboration. He gets too excited about everyone's ideas and supports them all. Ripple is Wells Fargo in a disguise. He says "blockchain" or "cryptocurrency" in every sentence, but it seems like he doesn't actually know what a blockchain is. He uses his influence from the banking world to make ripple seem popular. Augur is always following bitcoin hivemind around and copying what it says, but augur doesn't completely understand, so sometimes the words get mixed up.
Any thoughts on Aeternity? (created by Yanislav Malahov, "the godfather of ethereum")
Yanislav For those who are here from the start Yanislav Malahov is probably no stranger. Before the creation of ethereum he worked together with Vitalik and apparently helped with conceptualizing some of the revolutionizing concepts of Ethereum. I have no idea why he isn't involved in ethereum anymore after 2014. Aeternity Aeternity is another blockchain that is somewhat comparable with ethereum. There are a few differences. the biggest difference is in order to scale the blockchain they created off chain state channels. This enables people to do transactions and using smart contracts offchain but when there is a disagreement the smart conctract will enforced by the blockchain. this would heavily decrease the number of transactions ON chain. There are some other small differences
Use a hybrid form of POS and POW.
Heavily relies on Oracles machines.
Uses futarchy (?) as governance model (?)
Are those features promising ? or just another hypeword copycat project from some developer that regrets no being involved in ethereum anymore ? p.s. I did my best to explain the main concepts but im a noob so correct me if i'm wrong
An early consensus seems to be developing around a mechanism for setting interest rates in Casper. A targeted inflation rate determined by the community, combined with a variable percentage of total ETH supply at stake would create a floating interest rate. This rate would allocate resources between network security and competing investments such as ICOs. This chart of a hypothetical 0.75% inflation rate shows how the return on staking rises exponentially as staking participation falls. This is a critical design element that will ensure enough stakers are present at any given time. Conversely, the staking rate falls quickly if too much of ETH supply is participating. This design feature will prevent too much ETH being tied up in the staking process, thereby freeing up capital to be invested in Ethereum’s burgeoning ecosystem. The optimal inflation rate is likely to change over time in relation to ETH’s market cap and other factors. Perhaps The Foundation could propose the inaugural inflation rate. The community can take over this task as voting systems and futarchy improve. Does the community feel there is a better rate setting mechanism being discussed? What are the draw backs to a staking system of Targeted Inflation/Variable Participation?
Ethereum has an active project exploring the use of Futarchy as a framework to develop tools and governance capabilities within Distributed Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). I am keenly interested in these efforts. At Verity, my team is actively developing reputation tools and community governance capabilities designed to help Ethereum, DAOs, as ... ETH for a futarchy on top of Ethereum), and token S[k] is worth z DAO tokens, where a good value for z might be 0.1 and m self-adjusts to keep expenditures reasonable. Note that for this to work the DAO would need to also sell its own tokens for the external reference asset, requiring another allocation; perhaps m should be targeted so the ... A simple futarchy-based implementation might work as follows. Suppose that there are N projects asking for a grant consisting of the entire currency supply to be distributed during some time period, and the desire is to select the one that will maximize the value of the coin after one year. Futarchy, the idea of using prediction markets as a guide to help organisations make decisions, was formalised by economist Robin Hanson in Ethereum's Vitalik Buterin bets on the future of Futarchy Home There has been a lot of interest in decentralized governance algorithms in the Ethereum community, both recently in the search for tools for getting consensus on resolving the DAO issue and more broadly because one of the attractions of Ethereum is the ability to more easily implement such things.
Prediction Market Governance and Alternative Prediction Market Applications - Martin Koeppelmann
Research into the area has been vibrant, culminating in Hanson's concept of Futarchy: A prediction-market based governance system. At the same time, the real-world applications have been few and far. Support the show, consider donating: 1619zri1pbn8G2M6Arqz85qgto5FbPMjw7 (http://bit.ly/29u7LIF) Few things arouse excitement among free market believers and ... ETHNews.com is the central hub for all things Ethereum. Interview with Matt Liston from Gnosis on Futarchy after 2017 Ethereal Summit event. The first will introduce Futarchy as an alternative approach to DAO governance, and the latter will discuss a variety of alternative prediction market applications. https://ethereumfoundation.org ... Robert Kiyosaki 2019 - The Speech That Broke The Internet!!! KEEP THEM POOR! - Duration: 10:27. MotivationHub Recommended for you